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Abstract 
Most studies examine post conflict society based in security and aid management approach for conflict-
management. However, some scholars in conflict studies also suggest an institutional design approach 
to accommodate conflict parties in aftermath regions, which focuses on seeking an appropriate and 
acceptable “formula” to resolve conflicts. Based on Indonesia’s case, this study proposes a political 
compromise approach among different parties, at least for core conflict groups, to formulate an 
institutional framework in ensuring sustainable peace. This study discusses the feasibility of 
institutional design in order to mitigate dispute escalation in conflict-prone areas in Indonesia through 
applying theories of centripetalism (Lijphart,1969) and consocialism (Horowitz, 1985). This paper 
utilizes the analysis tool of  Ilievski and Wolff (2011) to analyze the institutional design of conflict 
resolution 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
Regarding mitigating conflict escalation, 
Barron and colleagues point out that 
institutions play pivotal role in mediating 
potential conflict at local level (2004). They 
found a strong correlation between 
institutions and conflict (Ibid). Informal 
institutions, such as religious organizations 
and local culture institutions are, in some 
areas, involved in conflict resolution but in 
other cases they also tend to provoke 
conflict. Similarly, formal institutions, in 
some degree, significantly contribute to 
diminish and solve conflict through their 
security and public service authorities. 
However, most public institutions do not 
have a decent capacity to manage the 
conflict, especially at local level, thus they 
fail to cope with conflict effectively. 
Besides the issue of capacity, Wilson 
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stresses that unequal representation 
amongst ethnic and religious groups in a 
local government and a bureaucratic system 
has been a critical factor in the bottom line 
of the likelihood of conflict (2005). 
By this line, we would agree to say that 
institutions, both formal and informal, are 
critical elements in post-conflict areas. 
They can actively contribute to relieving 
violent conflict and in the same way they 
can also revive dispute in affected areas of 
conflict. The institution becomes a 
fundamental issue for ensuring a peaceful 
environment in post-conflict regions in 
Indonesia. This paper focuses more on 
formal government organizations which 
actively engage in this process as a 
following thesis of Huntington 
(1968[2006])) and Fukuyama (2011) about 
the important strong structural state of a 
civil society for developing stable and 
effective democracy. Therefore, the aim of 
this paper is to examine the following 
question:  What are the alternative 
institutional designs to mitigate conflict 
escalation in the post-conflict areas of 
Indonesia? In order to answer this question, 
the next section will explore the concept of 
institutionalism and institutionalization. 
This section followed by a discussion of 
two institutional design theories which 
offer some possible strategies to 
accommodate competing claims of multi 
ethnic and religious societies. This paper 
will be concluded by a case discussion 
based on both institutional design thoughts 
in Indonesian context.  
 
B. DISCUSSION 
Indonesian post conflict society; a brief 
background 
Since Indonesia is in the middle of 
democratic transition, it has been able to 
avoid encumbrances that may impede the 
above progress of economic and 
democratic development. However, the 
biggest challenge is the possibility of 
violent conflicts as a result of political 
change (Klinken, 2007; Wilson, 2008). The 
forms of social conflict in Indonesia are 
similar phenomena which have occurred in 
countries that have diverse ethnic and 
religious groups ruled by authoritarian 
regimes, and they are still in an ongoing 
process of democratic transition, like post-
communist Eastern and Central Europe 
countries (Barron et.al, 2009a).  
Nevertheless, violent communal conflicts 
in Indonesia, which resulted in a high 
number of deaths and displacements, have 
arose at a local level and only in particular 
areas in Indonesia during 1998-2005. They 
have occurred in the following regions: 
East and West Kalimantan, South and 
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Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku 
Aceh, and Papua. These conflicts mainly 
consist of ethno-religious warfare and 
political clashes between separatist groups 
and Indonesian security forces and have 
occurred at a district and provincial level.  
The phenomenon of conflict escalation 
during a political transition shows an 
example of violence accompanying 
political development (Huntington, (1968 
[2006]); Kingsbury, 2007a; Fukuyama, 
2011). Although most social conflicts have 
stopped at present it does not mean that 
such conflicts will not arise again. All the 
conflict groups are still in the process of 
reconciliation and there is a possibility of 
conflict being fueled by certain interests 
aimed at undermining peaceful interests. 
Researchers had identified several key 
factors that triggered violent communal 
conflicts in Indonesia. First, economic 
factors which implies poverty, inequality 
development, and high rate of 
unemployment in affected areas of conflict 
(Klinken, 2000; Wilson, 2005; Barron et.al, 
2004; Barron et.al, 2009a). For instance, 
Klinken found that the high rate of 
unemployed youth was a bottom-view 
problem of the violent conflict in Maluku 
(2000).  
Second, diversity of ethnic and religious 
groups makes Indonesia prone to ethno-
religious conflicts. This factor may refer to 
some cases in West and Central Kalimantan 
where migrant groups were reluctant to 
adjust to local cultures, which created a 
broad gap among migrant and local 
communities (Wilson, 2005). Other studies 
also emphasize economic disparities among 
ethnic or religious communities in which a 
particular group has a more dominant role 
in economic activities than another group. 
That contributes to an escalation of conflict 
among those factions. (Barron et.al, 2009a; 
Mishra, 2009).  
Third, weak public institutions are driven 
by political change. The fall of military 
government in 1998 was followed by a 
process of democratization and political 
and financial decentralization to district 
level. The transition government employed 
liberal democracy with an advancing 
number of political parties and radical 
decentralization through local and 
provincial election (Mishra, 2009; Klinken 
2007b). This rapid political change sparked 
high political competition at a local level 
where local actors used the identity of 
ethnic and religious issues to gain support 
and power. Since Indonesian political 
parties have not been well institutionalized 
to manage their organization, members and 
constituents, this radical political transition 
has also contributed to the escalation of 
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conflict (Baron, 2009a; Klinken 2000, 
2007b; Wilson, 2005, 2008). Moreover, 
civil services, legal and security institutions 
which play an important role to mitigate 
and resolve conflicts, also have not yet been 
transformed successfully throughout 
government levels (Mishra, 2009).   
 
Institutionalism and Institutionalization 
This section starts with a discussion of 
institutional theory as a tool of analysis in 
this paper to explain the pivotal role of 
government institutions in defusing violent 
conflict in postwar areas. Institutional 
theory is a root of political theory (Peter, 
2005) that emphasizes “the process and 
mechanisms by which structure, schema, 
rules and routines become established as 
authoritative guidelines for social 
behavior” (Scott, 2004; p. 408). To deeply 
understand institutionalism, we should 
clearly recognize to what extent social form 
will be acknowledged as an institution. 
Accordingly, Peter (2005) characterizes 
four substantial components of an 
institution as following (p.18-19). First, the 
basic feature of an institution is that all 
societies are formed in a structural system 
which can be organized in formal or 
informal patterns. The formal structure 
refers to bureaucracy, political parties, and 
social organization; and the informal 
structure can be networking and a group 
based on shared values. The second 
component would be sustainable stability. 
An institution should be stable, it does not 
mean that the institution should be resistant 
to change but in contrast it needs to be able 
to adapt over time. The third element 
implies an institution’s capacity to 
influence and construct its members upon 
its rules. The way an institution shapes its 
followers can be by means of formal or 
informal methods, which, obviously, 
depend on the form of the institution itself. 
The last element is common and shared 
values among members of an institution. 
This value bonds members which may be 
embedded in the institution as part of 
history and then taken for granted. 
The institutional theory consists of diverse 
assumptions and propositions which 
unified by “the institutions matter” as the 
core theses which commonly refers to 
governance structures (Scott, 2004; p. 408).  
Scott then differentiates three main 
approaches of the institutional theory based 
on governance structures, namely: rational 
choice, normative, and cultural-cognitive. 
The rational-choice theorists focus on a 
regulative institution factor and stress the 
design of organizational structure to reach 
public expectations. This perspective 
frames the institution as a system of rules 
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which are created by individuals in order to 
protect their own interests and to gain 
incentives. One rational-choice paradigm is 
transaction economic cost which points out 
that the principal behavior of an individual 
in an economic system is a transaction 
which refers to interchange value among 
individuals. In some extents, exchange 
values become complicated and the 
outcomes are unstable. As a result net 
transactional costs significantly improve. 
Accordingly, the institutionalists of this 
paradigm are then concerned with how to 
configure the framework of governance 
institutions  in order to diminish such 
transaction costs, such as redesigning 
market systems, labor outsourcing rules, 
and property rights law. (Ibid; p. 410).    
The institutionalists of a normative 
approach argue that the institutions are 
influenced by a normative system which 
consists of shared norms and values and 
promotes guidelines, rules and obligatory 
elements to a social system. They argue that 
people behave in order to follow normative 
standards instead of maximize individual 
incentives. The standards of behavior are 
accepted through involvement in one or 
more institutions and that those institutions 
shape social values. Different from the 
rational-choice perspective, the normative 
institutionalist view is that rules should not 
be externally imposed but internalized by 
members of the institution. And the last 
school of institutionalism is cultural-
cognitive theory that emphasizes the shared 
conception that determines social life. This 
social system is developed by a social 
connection amongst individuals upon a 
shared understanding about reality in micro 
and macro level. On micro level, members 
of institutions come and share the 
interpretation of the social reality 
(workplace, market) and also share it with 
all the institutions’ members. Equally, on 
macro level, people create symbols, like 
languages, and shared perceptions, such as 
sciences and religions, that determine social 
reality and construct a cognitive process for 
the members (Scott, 2005; p. 410-411).    
Referring to the above discussion, 
institutionalism obviously underlines the 
important role of governance structures to 
remain and ensure stability in societies 
through shared value and understanding, 
rules, and institutional design. In the other 
words, governance institutions are expected 
to effectively regulate societies to maintain 
sustainable stability. Similarly, Huntington, 
as an intitutionalist, also emphasizes the 
stability of political order as a substantial 
determinant in the process of 
institutionalization. He argues that an 
established political system depends on a 
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capacity of political parties as a main part 
of governance institutions to conform and 
channel the participation of other social 
groups in an appropriate way without 
disturbing the system (1968[2006]). In 
addition, Huntington stresses that failure of 
an institutionalization process in a political 
society tends to create a political crisis 
(Ibid). To understand the 
institutionalization process, he then 
characterizes four dimensions of political 
institutionalization that commonly occur in 
political development, which are: 
adaptability vs. rigidity, complexity vs. 
simplicity, autonomy vs. subordination, 
and coherence vs. disunity. Firstly, the 
quality of an organization in exercising an 
adaptive capacity indicates when it is more 
able to adapt to environmental change. 
Likewise, a society with a high level of 
institutionalization is more likely to have a 
complex organizational system that 
employs multiple organizational units and 
functional organization sub-units. 
Furthermore, a political institution that has 
independence in managing its own interests 
and values indicates a highly developed 
political system. Lastly, the organizational 
capacities for effective coordination 
throughout institutional members of the 
community imply a highly developed 
political community. Disunity of 
organizations refers to fragmented and 
uncoordinated organizations due to a lack 
of planning, coordination, and a capacity 
for weak leadership, which reflects an 
unstable political community that results in 
them being less institutionalized (Ibid; p. 
13-22). In summary, a well institutionalized 
organization is shaped by elements of 
adaptability, complexity, autonomy and 
coherence. Thus, the organizations with a 
high level of institutionalization will have a 
strong capacity to survive and remain a 
stable environment.   
 
Designing Institutions for Managing 
Post-Conflict Societies 
Besides employing the security and aid 
management approach for conflict-
management, some scholars in conflict 
studies also suggest an institutional design 
approach to accommodate conflict parties 
in aftermath regions, which focuses on 
seeking an appropriate and acceptable 
“formula” to resolve conflicts (Ilievski and 
Wolff, 2011). This approach works with 
political compromise among different 
parties, at least for core conflict groups, to 
formulate an institutional framework in 
ensuring sustainable peace. The 
institutional design perspective is a 
rational-choice approach towards 
institution in that the institutions are 
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redesigned and will be balanced when the 
actors contribute to the process and expect 
incentives, such as power, security, and 
economic gain. Moreover, in the paradigm 
of transaction of economic cost, 
redesigning institutions in post-conflict 
societies aims to reduce high transaction 
costs whereas conflict obviously triggers 
the high price of economic transaction 
costs, such as the labor and markets that 
have been distracted from economic 
activities and infrastructures that have been 
devastated. In other words, the stability of a 
new form of institutions, from rational-
choice perspective, depends on both 
enhancement of the incentives that are 
provided and the level of transaction costs 
that are produced.  
The institutional design in ethnic post-
conflict areas commonly focuses on a 
macro level of state structures (Ilievski and 
Wolff, 2011). An examination of macro 
level is determined by three dimensions, 
namely state constructions, composition of 
power in governmental institutions and 
legal acknowledgment of individuals, 
identity groups, and the state (Ibid). The 
state construction highlights a political area 
of the state which refers to unitary and 
federal systems or hybrid political form. 
Besides that, this dimension also considers 
institutional design decision which focuses 
on a number of governmental levels with 
decision-making competences. Most states 
in a stable condition have a structural and 
functional asymmetry in all political-
territorial organizations. The states can 
manage all political territories in an 
asymmetric pattern and all territorial 
entities conform to the exact same degree of 
functional competences. Those entities also 
employ functional and structural 
competences through a consistent form of 
local political organizations. Nevertheless, 
the pattern of the decision-making structure 
in the divided societies may have 
distinctive manners. Although, states are 
formed in structural asymmetry, but some 
territories may have different functional 
competences by a self-governing system 
and those specific entities may apply their 
competences through distinctive 
approaches of political institutions. For 
instance, territorial sub-state institutions 
accommodate ethnic groups which are 
different from the majority of the 
population. Those sub-state institutions will 
exercise additional competences to support 
the specific interests of their societies (Ibid; 
p. 7).      
The formation for the power of government 
institutions implies three elements. The first 
element focuses on a political system which 
is parliamentary, presidential, and semi-
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presidential. And the second element 
underlines power-sharing and inclusiveness 
between executive and legislative that 
affects the election system. In addition, 
political relations between these institutions 
can also be extended to judicial institutions 
which determine the recruitment of judges 
and prosecutors. The last element refers to 
political relations among three government 
institutions which are a separation of power 
from executive and legislative; and a degree 
of independency from judicial institutions 
(Ilievski and Wolff, 2011; p. 8).   
The third dimension of macro level of state 
structure is a relationship between citizens, 
identity groups and the state that highlights 
legal acknowledgement and protection of 
different identity groups by the state. The 
recognition of minority groups in this 
dimension relates to human and minority 
right legislation that guarantees the rights of 
different identity groups. In addition, the 
state needs to complement the rights of 
equality and non-discrimination and 
emphasize differential treatment and 
affirmative action which manifest diverse 
societies and promote sustainable peace. 
These three dimensions are interrelated and 
interconnected to redesign institutional 
structure in post-conflict areas (Ilievski and 
Wolff, 2011; p. 9). 
In the further discussion, this paper 
exercises consociationalism and 
centripetalism as theories of institutional 
design in the conflict affected areas. Both 
theories apply the above three dimensions 
in different levels to propose possible types 
and methods of government institutions in 
order to defuse violent conflicts 
culmination.  
The discussion is started by the 
consociational theory which proposes a 
concept of power-sharing among conflicted 
groups in fragmented societies. This theory 
was originally developed by Lijphart - 
based on his study of experience of the 
Dutch society in managing conflict 
between Catholic, Calvinist, liberal and 
socialist in 1917 – 1967. Lijphart defines 
consociational democracy as “government 
by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy 
with a fragmented political culture into a 
stable democracy” (1969; p. 216). Further 
Lijphart states four determinants of a 
successful consociational democracy. First, 
the elites have the capacity to facilitate the 
various interests and demands of all groups. 
Second, the elites have the capacity to 
transform the gap interests to an appropriate 
agreement which is accepted by all the 
elites of the conflict groups. Third, the 
elites have a commitment to maintain the 
system and increase the quality cohesion 
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and stability. And the last determinant is all 
elites and actors who are involved in this 
agreement process should be aware the 
risks of political fragmentation (Ibid).  
 This concept has been developed further in 
the context of the power-sharing 
mechanism in the multiethnic societies. In 
line in this issue, Lijphart then examines 
India as an example of a strong 
consociational democratic country. He 
argues that India has violated the thesis of 
John Stuart Mill (1958), that democracy is 
not suitable to multiethnic countries and is 
impossible in linguistically divided 
societies (1996; p. 258).  To criticize Mill’s 
preposition, Lijphart points out that the 
power-sharing theory acknowledges 
diverse ethno religious communities that 
can apply a democratic system but they 
should achieve four pivotal elements of 
consociational democracy. They are grand 
coalition, cultural autonomy, 
proportionality in the election system, 
public service officers, and minority veto 
(Ibid).   
The first element concerns grand coalition 
governments that represent all ethno 
religious and linguistic groups. The form of 
government coalition can be a very flexible 
method which depends on the elite’s 
agreement. For instance, the grand coalition 
in the Belgian cabinet represents two 
linguistic groups, Dutch speakers and 
French speakers. Yet another example of 
grand coalition is not in the cabinet form 
but in the top governmental positions, such 
as president and vice president, prime 
minister, or assembly speakers. Cyprus and 
Lebanon employ this coalition form to 
represent ethnic and religious groups 
(Lijphart, 1996; p. 259).  
In the element of cultural autonomy, 
Lijphart characterizes them into three 
models. The first is a federal system in 
which a state territory is separated based on 
linguistic boundaries, which also has a 
linguistic anatomy. Belgium, Switzerland, 
Czech Republic, and Slovakia are examples 
of this autonomous model. The second are 
the rights of religious or linguistic groups to 
have and manage their own autonomous 
schools which are financially supported by 
the state. Belgium and the Netherlands 
apply this autonomous education system. 
The last form of autonomy is a legal 
acknowledgement of specific laws that 
upon ethnic and religious costume which 
commonly concern marriage, divorce, child 
adoption, burial or custody issues. This 
autonomy system is applied in Lebanon, 
Cyprus and India as examples (Lijphart, 
1996; p. 260). 
The consociational element of 
proportionality refers to two domains 
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namely election system and public service 
employment (Lijphart, 1996; p. 259). A 
proportional electoral system encourages a 
low threshold for small parties and an 
arrangement of grand coalition with the 
parliament members whom have reserved 
seats for minority groups. Proportionality 
should also be considered in government 
resources allocation and within a public 
services recruitment process. In the public 
administration field, this issue is 
extensively examined in representative 
government theories (Kingsley, 1944) 
which emphasize proportional public 
bureaucracy through selecting and pointing 
public officials based on social 
representation, such as ethnic, religion and 
gender.      
The last dimension of a consociational 
democracy is a minority veto with 
appreciation to minority rights and 
autonomy. This dimension refers to public 
acknowledgment that minority groups have 
rights to conserve their autonomy from any 
attempts to eradicate it. The minority veto 
in some societies is recognized as an 
informal understanding. However, the right 
of a minority veto can also be formally 
confirmed in a constitution, especially in 
the communities that have a few minority 
groups and face solid majority groups, like 
Belgium and Cyprus (Lijphart, 1996; p. 
261).  
From the above four elements, Lijphart 
highlights two of them as essential factors 
of a consociational democracy, namely 
sharing executive power and group 
autonomy. Power-sharing refers to equal 
participation in all core politically 
representative groups and political policy-
making systems, most notably at the 
executive institutions. Group autonomy 
implies that those ethno religious and 
linguistic groups have the authority to 
manage their internal community systems, 
especially in education and cultural sectors 
(2002; p. 39).   
In the practical level, consociational 
scholars distinguish liberal and corporate 
consociationalism perspectives (Ilievski 
and Wolff, 2011; p. 11). The liberal 
consociation concerns various political 
identities in a democratic process and 
facilitates all kinds of group identities, such 
as minority groups, sub-groups, or trans-
group identities (Ibid). This perspective 
supports self-governing territory is which 
has defined itself from the bottom up 
process. Accordingly, the liberal 
consociationalist accommodate more than 
three self-governing entities and regards the 
possibility of some entities to have more (or 
fewer) political and economic advantages 
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than another, which depends on some 
determinants, i.e. population and natural 
resources (Ibid).  On the other hand, the 
corporate consociation selectively 
accommodates groups based on the 
assumption that group identities are 
internally identical and externally united 
(Ibid). This perspective criticizes Lijphart’s 
original idea, which argues that if power is 
widely shared then it will be difficult to 
make a decision. The accommodation 
process often leads to deadlock and tends to 
decline the legitimacy of power. Therefore, 
selecting a group is a suitable method to 
effectively manage power-sharing and 
support equal political representatives.  
Let’s turn to another thought of institutional 
design which is centrapetalism. This theory 
is apparently initiated by Donald Horowitz 
in his seminal book “Ethnic Group in 
Conflict” (1985). Horowitz examines some 
possible structural engineering to retard 
conflict in deeply divided societies through 
an electoral system. The first alternate 
method is the rotating of presidency which 
represents different core groups in the 
multiethnic societies. However, Horowitz 
warns that this method is difficult in post-
war societies and tends to fail. He then 
mentions an unsuccessful experience of 
presidency rotated between three groups in 
Benin after the civil war in Colombia in 
1960s. The second possibility is a “national 
government” which is mainly formed based 
on a majoritarian coalition. This method is 
associated with the consociationalism 
school in which Horowitz has been 
criticized. Horowitz argues that grand 
coalition is sufficient in stable political 
systems when group elites have more 
willingness to mutually compromise after 
the election. From this line, Horowitz 
emphasizes the important process of group 
integration in a pre-electoral rather than in 
a post-electoral (Caluwaerts, 2010). This 
perspective suggests that all candidates 
gather electoral support from different 
groups – either major or minor ethnic 
groups- through promoting a reciprocal 
cooperation. In summary, Horowitz offers 
the ethnic accommodation prior to the 
election as the third alternative of electoral 
engineering in multiethnic societies 
(Horowitz, 1985, 2004).  
Based on Horowitzh’s work, some scholars 
who confront consociationalism draw an 
alternative concept of institutional design in 
the multiethnic societies which is 
centripetalism. Benjamin Reilly defines 
this concept as “a continual process of 
conflict management, a recurring cycle of 
dispute resolution in which contentious 
issues must ultimately be solved via 
negotiation and reciprocal cooperation, 
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rather than simple majority rule” (2001; p. 
7). As a form of conflict management, this 
theory underlines the desire to create 
incentives for integration amongst 
competing sub-groups in multi ethnic and 
religious. In the political view, a political 
system creates incentives to political parties 
and candidates that collaborate beyond 
ethnic and religious borders prior to 
election to encourage such inter-group 
accommodation (Ibid).  
In post-ethno-religious war societies people 
tend cooperate with them who have similar 
ethno-religious background. Politicians are 
likely to propose policies to attract voters 
from their ethnic or religious groups. The 
voters also do not have a willingness to vote 
for candidates from their rival groups. In 
this polarized political society, the group 
minorities will become victims of an unfair 
democratic system. As a net result, the 
likelihood of reemerging violent conflict 
becomes possible. For coping with this 
crisis, Horowitz (1985) offers a strategy 
which is an electoral rules design that can 
enforce politicians to be mutually 
dependent on the voters whom are members 
of different groups. The electoral rules also 
encourage political parties to develop the 
formation of a multi-ethnic coalition. In 
gaining support from other groups, 
candidates must behave moderately and 
engage in intergroup bargains (Horowitz, 
1985; p. 632). Another electoral rule in 
promoting multiethnic parties is the 
alternative vote which refers to a rank-order 
electoral system (Reilly, 2012; p. 264). 
Since most people in segmented societies 
are not likely to vote the candidates from 
their rival groups, the centripetalism 
electoral rule requires voters to declare 
more than one candidate in the candidate 
lists. Later, if no one candidate has an 
absolute majority of vote, then these votes 
are transferred based on their rankings for 
seeking the majority supported winner 
according to the accumulation of votes. 
This system creates an incentive for the 
politicians to persuade voters from different 
ethnic groups to maximize their electoral 
opportunities through secondary preference 
votes. Another approach of the electoral 
rules is a requirement of political parties to 
have a list of candidates from multiethnic 
politicians in order to make voters regard 
policy issues rather than ethnicity (Ibid).     
In practice, Reilly encourages three 
interrelated and distinct elements that 
should be applied to the divided societies. 
The first is electoral incentives for 
promoting politicians to gain voters from 
different ethnic groups to their own. The 
political parties are expected to balance 
their political agenda and broadly open 
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their policy focus to get more electoral 
support from extensive multi-groups. The 
second is politicians from different groups 
have an incentive to actively get involved 
in bargaining arenas to negotiate with 
cross-partisan and cross-ethnic and to 
further have their vote-pooling deals. 
During this negotiation process, all entities 
discuss and bargain substantial issues that 
go beyond ethnic and other cleavages lines. 
The last element is a development of 
centrist and multiethnic political parties. 
The coalition parties seek multi-ethnic 
votes and promote flexible policy agendas 
which address the interests of multi groups. 
The coalition consists of inter-ethnic 
affiliation that aim to sustain cross-ethnic 
bargains upon multi-interest policy 
platforms (2001; p. 11) 
In general both theories propose a conflict 
resolution through institutional design, 
particularly in political parties, cabinet, 
parliament, and election institution.  
Moreover, both perspectives have a 
common ground of the important role of 
political parties and election process to 
defuse conflict mitigation in societies prone 
to conflict. Both theories can also be 
combined to strengthen reconciliation and 
institutionalization processes.   
 
Empirical Analysis of Institutional 
Design in Indonesia  
This section discusses the feasibility of 
institutional design in order to mitigate 
dispute escalation in conflict-prone areas in 
Indonesia through applying theories of 
centripetalism and consocialism. This 
paper utilizes the analysis tool of  Ilievski 
and Wolff (2011) to analyze the 
institutional design of conflict resolution 
based on three dimensions as previously 
   Table 1 . Institutional Arrangement for Defusing Violent Conflict in Indonesia   
Institutional Design of Conflict 
Resolution 
National level Regional/Local levels 
State construction Federalism (not based on ethnic 
and religious groups) 
Multi ethno religious local parties 
The institutions of government  Multi ethnic and religious 
coalition government 
Proportionality in public services 
officials appointment 
Right and indentities Recognition and protection of 
human and minority rights 
Ensuring implementation the law 
of human and minority rights 
  Source: adapted from Ilievski and Wolff (2011; p. 52) 
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discussed. Further, the three dimensions of 
institutional designs will be analyzed in two 
levels, national and regional/local levels, 
which are showed in the Table 1 below.  
 
State construction 
In the macro level, I would argue that 
federalism is a sufficient institutional 
design to decrease tension of violence in the 
areas of conflict in Indonesia. The 
federalism which I mean here relates more 
to Horowitz’s concept, which is a 
federation based on heterogeneous entities 
(2007). The federalism offers a political 
recognition of cultural and ethnic pluralism 
from dominating majority ethnic groups in 
the multiethnic countries. This state system 
is compatible to Indonesia as a very diverse 
society. Indonesia has 2.500 local 
languages, 1.340 ethnic groups/subgroups 
which consist of around five major ethnic 
groups (Javanese 40.2%, Sundanese 15.5%, 
Batak 3.6%, and others 40.7%) and five 
major religions (Islam 87.18%, Protestant 
6.96%, Catholic 2.91%, Hindu 1.69% and 
Buddha 0.72%)1.  
In the political perspective, heterogeneous 
federation creates more opportunities for 
politicians from different ethnic or religious 
groups to interact and encounter each other. 
                                                          
1 The data based on Indonesian 2010 Census. 
Sources : 
http://sp2010.bps.go.id/files/ebook/kewarganegaraa
As a net result, those regional politicians 
can learn and share their various 
backgrounds that can later strengthen their 
regional communities. From this token, in 
the regional level, I suggest developing 
local political parties, which are not 
affiliated to certain ethnic and religious 
groups. The local political parties need to 
concern cutting cross issues in regional and 
local levels, such as environment, 
education and health services in remote 
areas, or infrastructure issues. The 
existence of local parties focuses on post-
conflict areas, like in Aceh, Maluku and 
Papua. In addition, the election committee 
can employ Horowitz’s “vote alternative” 
in order to enforce politicians to 
reciprocally depend on their rival group 
members.  
Actually, there are local parties in Aceh as 
a result of the Helsinki peace agreement 
between Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM 
(The Aceh Independence Movement) and 
the Government of Indonesia to end thirty 
years of feuding on the 15th of August, 
2005. The Aceh local parties accommodate 
political rights of ex-combatants of the 
GAM. However, Maluku and Papua 
peoples do not yet have local political 
n%20penduduk%20indonesia/files/search/searchte
xt.xml 
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parties to directly encourage their local 
issues in a policy-making process.  
Another substantial reason of the 
importance of local parties is that most 
political parties in Indonesia are very 
centralistic in their decision-making 
process. The direct involvement of a 
national board of parties in deciding 
candidates in local and provincial elections 
is the most important example of centralism 
and rigidity of Indonesian political parties. 
The regional and local boards do not have 
any authority to select the candidates. Only 
the national boards of parties have an 
authority to point out who will be the 
candidates that represent parties in local 
and regional elections. The rigidity of 
political parties to select local leader 
candidates tends to trigger the likelihood of 
conflict eruption. 
 
The Institutions of Government 
 The national government should 
consist of the grand coalition based on 
multi ethnic and religious groups. This is a 
very crucial issue in a very diverse society 
like Indonesia. It is impossible to 
accommodate a thousand ethnic/sub-ethnic 
and various interest groups in Indonesia, 
but at least, the national government shows 
their political commitment to accommodate 
all groups, most notably, minority groups, 
in appointment of cabinet members or high 
public officials.  
In the practical level, the grand coalition in 
this issue, not only refers to various ethnic 
and religious groups but, in the broad sense, 
the coalition may imply other interest 
groups, such as: military retired faction, 
businessmen faction, lawyers, scholars 
group, and technocrats. The rise of interest 
groups in some extent is a very positive way 
to reduce the tension of ethnic and religious 
segregation. The interest groups have a 
capacity to manage the competition and 
bargain with the internal organization 
which is commonly based on merit 
preferences (educational and experience 
background) rather than any identity 
cleavages (ethnic and religious 
backgrounds).    
In the regional and local level, the 
proportionality of selecting public officials 
according to ethnic and religious groups is 
very critical, most notably in post-dispute 
areas. This issue affirms Wilson’s study 
which found that unequal representation 
amongst ethnic and religious groups in the 
local bureaucratic systems correlates to the 
likelihood of conflict (2005). Accordingly, 
the government institutions at regional and 
local levels should seriously concern on 
equal access of all ethnic and religious 
groups in the public officials selection 
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process. . In public administration 
perspective, this policy refers to the 
representative bureaucracy concept of 
Kingsley (1944) and Krislov (1974) that 
democratizes public bureaucracy through 
recruiting officials and pointing high public 
leaders based on social representation, such 
as ethnic, religion and gender (Farazmand, 
2010;p. 256).  
In addition, in order to reduce segregation 
of ethnic and religious identity at a 
regional/local levels, the government 
institutions need to emphasize other 
identities that cross ethnic and religious 
lines. There are some possible cross-cutting 
identity issues in terms of proportionality, 
namely gender and disability groups. These 
characteristics are often associated with 
minority groups – not as ethnic or religious 
identities - in the appointment of public 
officers. Most notably, disabled people face 
many obstacles to access job opportunities 
in developing countries due to the public 
misperception that disability is a curse. 
Highlighting these two minority groups, 
which are beyond ethnic and religious 
borders in selecting and appointing public 
officials, can initially reduce the intention 
of segregations. Therefore, the government 
institutions should have a transparent and 
accountable mechanism in selecting public 
officers through promoting equal 
employment opportunity to the minority 
groups.   
 
Right and Identities 
 In the national level, the Indonesian 
government acknowledges and protects the 
human-minority rights based on the 1945 
Constitution  of  Republic Indonesia. 
Indonesia has also passed Law 39/1999 
considering Human Rights and Law 
26/2000 considering the Indonesian Court 
of Human Rights. In addition, Indonesia 
has ratified the International Covenant of 
Economy, Social, and Culture Rights  and 
has then passed Law 12/2005 concerning 
ratification International Covenant of 
Economy, Social, and Culture Rights. In 
order to ensure the implementation of those 
laws, the Indonesian government creates 
the Indonesian National Human Rights 
Commission as an independent institution. 
The members of  this commission are 
transparently and independently selected by 
the independent committee. Besides, the 
government institutions, Indonesian civil 
society organizations at national level also 
get actively involved in advocating, 
monitoring and promoting the protection of 
human and minority rights.      
However, the Indonesian government 
institutions in regional and local levels 
strugle to encounter problems in promoting 
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and protecting human and minority rights. 
The main problem is public awareness of 
human and minority rights and the capacity 
of security officers to implement the law of 
human rights. The influence of a military 
regime for around thirty years still remains 
in  most local and regional government 
officers, especially the security officers. 
The police officers often fail to handle 
conflict due to a lacking capacity for 
negotiation and conflict management.  
For ensuring the impelementation of human 
and minority rights, the local and regional 
government institutions should persistently 
apply the form of good governance in all 
sectors. Good governance is required to 
encourage respect and enforcement of 
human rights which promote a peaceful 
environment in the post-conflict areas. The 
most important, the military and policy 
forces, are expected to perform an essential 
role in the early phase of peace-building 
and the reformation of rule-of-law. The 
regional and local government institutions 
should conduct the trainings of conflict 
resolution to improve the capability of their 
public officials, especially the police 
officers. Moreover, the media, educators, 
civil society activists, public servants, and 
politicians should work hand in hand to 
promote and advocate human and minority 
rights at regional and local levels.  
C. CONCLUSION  
A post-conflict area becomes a critical issue 
due to the fact that most societies that have 
experienced large-scale violent conflict 
have the possibility of recurring violent 
conflicts (Barron et al, 2009b). In order to 
relieve the escalation of violent conflict, 
many studies then suggest to strengthen 
government institutions to effectively 
rebuild governance in areas affected by 
conflict (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Bigdon and 
Hettige, 2003; Romeo, 2002).  
 In this token, the institutionalists 
show the essential role of government 
institutions to maintain sustainable stability 
and mitigate escalating dispute in conflict 
prone societies. In a rational-choice 
perspective, all members of an institution 
contribute to maintain a stable and peaceful 
environment in order to earn incentives of 
power and security. In addition, 
maintaining a peaceful environment can 
also significantly reduce the economic 
transaction cost.  
 Regarding conflict reduction and 
maintaining a peaceful condition, the 
institutionalists encourage institutional 
design through state construction, 
composition of government institutions, 
and recognizing identity, human, and 
minority rights. The consociationalism and 
centripetalism offers possible mechanisms 
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that influence the likelihood of success in 
the process of conflict resolution. However, 
one should keep in mind, this is a not a 
linier relationship in which there are 
various possible factors that can directly or 
indirectly determine those factors. For 
instance, the process of institutionalization, 
which is discussed by Huntington, may 
influence the capacity of organizations. 
Another  factor might be commitments of 
the leaders or elites of institutions to 
consistenly maintain peace environment.   
 As discussed above, there are two 
essential issues in the macro state level of 
institutional design for reducing conflict 
escalation in Indonesia, namely federation 
and local political parties. Although these 
two alternative methods take a huge amount 
of effort to be implemented; however, it is 
not an impossible feat to conduct. I would 
argue that developing political parties is 
more possible since Aceh already 
implemented this mechanism. The 
Indonesian government can employ the 
same method in Papua and Ambon. Besides 
that, as Huntington emphasizes, political 
parties are the main factor within a 
democratic system that represent the 
interests of a society, conciliate conflicting 
interests, coordinate with government 
institutions, and promote political stability. 
Therefore, Indonesian political parties 
should take a serious step to elevate their 
capacity, especially in recruiting and 
training their members, employing a 
transparent political organization budget, 
and strengthening their reciprocal relations 
with their constituents. 
Unfortunately, transforming an Indonesian 
state system from unitary to federation is 
easier said than done. There are two main 
obstacles the application of a federation 
system as an institutional design method. 
Firstly Indonesia has experienced a 
federalism system which was a result of the 
peace agreement between the Dutch 
government and the Indonesian 
government in 1949. However, Sukarno - 
the President of Republic Indonesia in that 
period - dissolved the federation and 
replaced the unitary system in 1950 due to 
rejection as a part of the Dutch colony. 
Since that time, the issue of federation has 
been associated with a bad history of 
colonization. Second, as part of that history, 
the military faction strongly disagrees 
every time the issue of federation rises in 
political discourses. The military can 
influence the political decision-making 
process through politicians who have 
retired from the military. For example, in 
1999 when ethno-religious conflicts and 
separatist movements significantly erupted 
after the fall of the authoritarian regime, 
Andi Ahmad Yani – Ensuring Peace Environment …. 
  
 
31 
Journal of Society and Governance 
President Abdul Rahman Wahid whom, 
elected by the Indonesian parliament 
members, suggested the federation system 
was a possible solution to reduce the violent 
conflicts. The military faction and some 
political parties protested the idea and 
argued that the unitary system is the final 
option and is unchangeable. Eventually, 
President Wahid was impeached and 
succeeded by his Vice President, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri in 2001, due to his political 
scandals. Based on these phenomena, I 
would argue that applying a federation 
system in Indonesia should be promoted 
and advocated in a more comprehensive 
way through developing an open dialog 
with anti-federation groups. Most 
importantly, further empirical studies of 
federation system and local political party 
as alternative institutional designs to defuse 
ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia have 
to be continually conducted.   
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